Transport taxes with multiple trip purposes by Kurt Van Dender
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND
APPLIED ECONOMIC SCIENCES
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES











Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)
tel: +32 (0) 16 32.66.33
fax: +32 (0) 16 32.69.10
e-mail: Isabelle.Benoit@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/ete





I consider an urban transport system in which passenger cars and buses are used for commuting trips
and for leisure trips, where both transport modes contribute to congestion, and where commuting is a
strict complement to taxable labour supply.  The optimal tax structure for raising a given amount of
government revenue is discussed for the cases where differentiation of the transport tax between trip
purposes is and is not possible.  Using a stylised dataset for Belgian urban enviroments, the optimal
tax structure is computed.  When differentiation of transport taxes between trip purposes is possible, a
shift to the taxation of relative complements to leisure is observed.  When differentiation is not
possible, reforming transport taxes generates substantial welfare gains only when the labour tax can
be simultaneously reduced.
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1. Introduction
Recently there is an increased interest in the theoretical and applied analysis of the welfare effects of
congestion pricing in the presence of pre-existing tax and pricing distortions (Mayeres and Proost,
1997 and 2001; Munk, 1999; Parry and Bento, 1999 and 2000; Calthrop et al., 2000; Parry, 2000;
Bento and Silva, 2001).  These and other studies apply the insights of the optimal taxation literature
and of the more recent double dividend debate to the transport sector, taking account of the fact that
congestion is a ‘feedback externality’, meaning that it has effects on the consumption of taxed
commodities.  Typically, the results are that optimal second-best congestion charges will deviate from
marginal external congestion costs, because of the interaction with existing distortionary taxes and
because of the positive government revenue requirement.  Furthermore, the welfare potential of
second-best congestion charges is seen to critically depend on revenue use.  In particular, it is
preferable to reduce labour taxes rather than to redistribute the revenues in a lump sum way (e.g.
Parry and Bento, 1999), unless the social welfare function exhibits a moderate or large degree of
inequality aversion (Mayeres and Proost, 1997).
Given that a large share of trips during congested hours are commuting trips, and that commuting is
complementary to labour supply, the interaction between congestion taxes and labour taxes can be
expected to be important.  In this paper, we investigate this interaction, taking account of the fact that
non-commuting trips use the road simultaneously with commuters.  Although the bulk of the
congestion pricing literature makes no explicit assumptions on the practical implementation of
congestion charges, it is often assumed that the charging system as such creates no congestion.  This
can be achieved through high-tech systems, e.g. on-road tolling points which deduct the charge from a
smart card as a vehicle passes the tolling point.  These systems are operational, and probably not
prohibitively expensive (e.g. Small and Gomez-Ibanez, 1998).  It is clear that such a system can not
directly adapt the charge to the trip purpose, while such differentiation of transport taxes would in
principle be desirable (e.g. Munk, 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the welfare cost of not differentiating charges between
commuting trips and leisure related trips.  Using a stylised dataset, it is suggested that (a) the welfare
costs of uniform transport taxes depend on the level of the labour tax rate, and (b) that transport tax
differentiation between leisure trips and commuting trips is strongly desirable when the labour tax
rate is taken to be fixed at, e.g., the reference level. The policy implication is that high-tech charging
systems should be complemented by other fiscal measures, e.g. income tax deductions of (part of) the
congestion charges for commuting trips, when the labour tax rate is not flexible.  When the
administrative costs of tax deductibility are high (as suggested in Munk, 1999), flexibility of the
labour tax is all the more important when considering transport tax reform.
The problem is studied in a simple general equilibrium model, which extends the analysis by Parry
and Bento (1999).  We model a transport system in which cars and buses simultaneously use a
congestible single-link network in order to produce leisure trips and commuting trips, during peak
hours.  There is a strict complementarity between the number of commuting trips and the supply of
fixed length labour days, in that each labour day requires a morning and an evening peak trip.
Government can raise taxes on labour and on transport in order to finance a given transfer.  In this3
context, we analyse the welfare effects of various types of tax reform.
1  Since a single representative
consumer approach is adopted, distributional issues are neglected.  This implies that lump sum
redistribution of transport tax revenues can safely be neglected, as using the revenues to cut the labour
tax –or possibly other transport taxes- will yield higher welfare gains.  Munk (1999) illustrates that
the benefits of tax differentiation towards leisure transport are higher when distributional concerns are
taken into account, provided that the expenditure share of leisure trips is higher for high income
households and that the degree of inequality aversion is sufficiently large.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical analysis.  The optimal tax
structure is derived for the cases where government can or can not differentiate transport taxes
between trip purposes.  Section 3 discusses a numerical illustration based on stylised data for
Belgium.  Section 4 concludes.
2. Theoretical analysis
In order to gain some insight in the characteristics of the optimal tax structure, we proceed as follows.
Section 2.1 presents the set-up of the model and the first order conditions for a consumer optimum.
The optimal tax structure is derived in section 2.2, for the second-best situation in which government
has no access to a lump sum transfer.  A distinction is made between the situation where tax
differentiation between trip purposes is and is not feasible (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively).  For
the case with differentiation, the components of the optimal taxes are explained, and the optimal
leisure and commuting transport taxes are given for the case where there are no cross-effects between
leisure and commuting transport.  For the case of uniform transport taxes, we limit ourselves to a
presentation of the system of first order conditions where we neglect cross-price elasticities. This is
sufficient to indicate what the basic effects of the uniformity constraint are.
2.1 Model components and consumer optimum
We use a strongly stylised representation of the urban transport sector, describing preferences by a
single representative consumer’s utility function as in (1) and assuming that the transport network can
be represented as a single congestible link between a single origin and destination.  Only morning and
evening peak transport are analysed.  The representative consumer neglects her impact on the
congestion externality.







where  composite commodity (untaxed numéraire)
             leisure related car trips
             leisure related bus trips
             commuting by car
             commut











= ing by bus
             leisure N =
(1)
                                                     
1 The extensions with respect to Parry and Bento, 1999, are: (a) explicit representation of leisure trips in
the theoretical analysis, (b) assuming a shared congestible network for both transport modes.  The methodology
is different as well.4
The subutility function T allows that the consumer is not indifferent between transport modes for
commuting.  The choice of commuting mode has no direct impact on other consumption, however.  In
particular, modal choices in leisure transport and in commuting are made independently, up to an
income effect.  A strict complementarity between labour supply L and commuting trips is imposed,
such that  34 Lq q =+.  We assume that the same transport mode is used for the morning and evening
commuting trip.
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This structure implies a number of assumptions and restrictions:
￿  Since all modes simultaneously use the same link and travel at the same speed, in-vehicle time (a)
for a trip is equal for all modes and trip purposes.
￿  The resource cost of a car trip is equal across trip motives.  Taxes are allowed to differ across
motives.  In section 2.2.2, we introduce the restriction that transport taxes can not be diversified
according to trip motives. The resource costs of car and bus trips are taken to be constant per trip.
￿  The money price of bus trips is equal to the tax.  This tax may or may not cover the resource costs
cp, which are covered out of tax revenues (centralised supply of bus transport).
￿  All transport modes contribute to congestion.  The contribution may differ between modes, but
not between trip motives.  In the theoretical analysis, the differential impact of modes on
congestion is neglected, for reasons of clarity.  The applied model in section 3 takes account of
the different congestion effects of cars and buses.
￿  In general, average waiting times at bus stops are a decreasing function of the supply of bus trips
(economies of density).  The supply of bus trips may increase when demand for bus trips
increases.  We abstract from economies of density here.  Including them is a straightforward
extension, as long as bus supply decisions are not endogenised.  A more detailed (partial
equilibrium) analysis of the role of economies of density in urban transport pricing is in Van
Dender and Proost (2001).
Normalising the gross wage to one, taking the numéraire (q0) as the untaxed good and normalising its
producer price to one, the consumer’s money and time budget constraints can be written as in (3).
These normalisations imply the assumptions of a constant returns to scale production technology,
where labour is the only input into production, operating in a perfectly competitive environment.  The
marginal product of labour, i.e. the gross wage, is constant and does not depend on the commuting
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.  As is common in
the transport literature (e.g. Jara-Diaz, 2000), the value of time equals the net wage corrected for the
disutility of commuting travel.
As the non-time resource costs of transport are constant, the indirect utility function can be written as
( ; , 1,...,4; ; ; ) Li VV t t i a z S == .  Recalling that F denotes the aggregate traffic flow,  a’F gives the
marginal external congestion costs in time units from an extra unit of traffic flow.  A marginal car trip
directly translates into an extra unit of flow.  As bus occupancy rates are taken to be constant, an extra
bus trip leads to proportionally less additional flow.  The proportionality between the flow effect of a















2.2 Optimal transport taxes
The government’s problem is to maximise consumer welfare (given by the indirect utility function),
subject to a budget constraint.  The budget constraint stipulates that the available tax instruments must6
be used to finance a given transfer S and the costs of bus supply.  Hence, all instruments have two
functions: raising revenue and internalising externalities.  Section 2.2.1 deals with the case in which
all transport commodities can be taxed separately.  In section 2.2.2, the taxes are constrained in the
sense that they are uniform across trip purposes.
In the formulation of the social welfare programme, production efficiency is assumed.  From
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), it is known that production efficiency is not necessarily optimal when
not all final commodities can be taxed.  Issues of production efficiency will be neglected in the
present analysis.
2.2.1 Differentiation of transport taxes across trip purposes
Government uses transport taxes and labour taxes in order to maximise the representative consumers’
indirect utility, subject to the tax revenue constraint.  The Lagrangian in (4) produces the critical
points.  Use of the lump sum transfer is ruled out, so that we are in second-best.
4
12 , 4
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In this set-up, there are five instruments (four transport taxes and the labour tax), for five taxable
commodities (four transport commodities and labour).  However, the strict complementarity between
labour and commuting trips ( 34 Lq q =+) implies that one instrument is redundant.  In other words,
there is an indeterminacy in the choice of the five instruments.  We first discuss the first order
conditions, and then look at optimal leisure transport taxes and commuting taxes when there are no
cross-price effects between both.
First-order conditions
After some re-arranging, the system of first-order conditions can be written as in equations (4.6).  We
write them out in full in order to clarify the similarities and the differences.  The expressions are in
terms of the uncompensated price elastictities.  The elasticities take account of the change in
congestion levels caused by price changes.  Note that due to the additive structure of the utility
function,  there is no substitution effect between labour and leisure trips by either transport mode.
Price changes for one trip purpose only affect demand for the other purpose through the income effect
and via congestion.  The main characteristics of the optimal taxes are discussed in the next four
points.
First, note that public transport taxes (6.2 and 6.4) reflect the marginal resource cost of the bus trip.
This of course follows from the assumption that government supplies bus trips, and uses taxes to
finance this supply.  The bus taxes are effectively equal to the bus fares (see 2)  As car users directly
incur the resource costs of their trips, these resource costs do not appear in the expressions for the car
taxes.
Second, all transport taxes (6.1 to 6.4) contain three similar components: the Ramsey component, the
trip interaction component and the Pigouvian component (as indicated in expression 6.1).  We briefly
discuss these components.
The Ramsey component refers to the revenue raising function of the tax.  It appears because of the
assumed absence of a lump sum tax instrument (S is constant).  It is decreasing in the own price
elasticity of the taxed good, and increasing in the marginal cost of public funds (µ/l).  Therefore, the7
Ramsey component is positive as long as the uncompensated own price elasticity of the taxed good is
negative, and when the marginal cost of public funds is larger than one.
The Pigouvian component (last term in the transport tax equations) stipulates that the transport taxes
are used to internalise the congestion externality caused by the taxed good.  However, this component
is decreasing in the marginal cost of public funds.  Together with the Ramsey component, this
indicates that the revenue raising function of the tax becomes relatively more important as the
marginal cost of public funds increases, and less attention is given to the correction of the
inefficiencies from the externality.
The trip interaction component consists of three subcomponents, each of which relates to the
deviation between taxes and marginal external congestion costs (plus the marginal resource cost of a
bus trip in the case of bus transport markets) on the other transport markets.  It captures the
interactions between taxes when there are pricing distortions on other transport markets (in the case of
the labour tax: all transport markets).  When these deviations are zero, the trip interaction components
drop from the tax expression.  However, as can be seen by considering the system of equations
formed by the first order conditions, marginal social cost pricing in transport is not optimal.  This
directly implies that trip interaction components will matter in the optimal tax structure.
Third, note that for commuting transport (6.3 and 6.4) only the sum of the transport tax and the labour
tax is determined by the first order condition.  This is the consequence of the strict complementarity
between commuting and labour supply, which causes one tax instrument to be redundant.  The
indeterminacy of the commuting and labour taxes is further discussed below.
Fourth, the expression for the labour tax contains no specific Pigouvian component.  The Ramsey and
the trip interaction components are similar to those of the transport taxes.  The absence of the
Pigouvian term suggests that labour supply as such generates no congestion.  However, as commuting
trips clearly do cause congestion and as the complementarity between commuting and labour supply is
strict, it may as well be said that labour supply causes congestion.  This again points to the
indeterminacy of the tax configuration concerning labour and commuting.
In the next paragraphs, we discuss the solution to the system of first order conditions under the
simplifying assumption that the cross price elasticities between commuting and leisure transport
markets are zero.  This allows to solve for the optimal leisure transport taxes from equations (6.1) and
(6.2), and for the labour- and commuting-related taxes from equations (6.3) to (6.5).  We first discuss
the optimal taxes for leisure trips, and then turn to commuting and labour taxes.8
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Optimal taxes for leisure trips
In case the uncompensated price elasticities between leisure and commuting markets are zero, the
optimal leisure car tax, conditional on an optimal leisure bus tax, is implicitly defined by equation (7).
The expression for the optimal leisure bus tax is analogous, except that it contains the resource cost of
the bus trip (as in 6.2).  It is omitted for reasons of brevity.
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Simultaneously setting optimal taxes for leisure trips by all modes implies that the modal taxes do no
longer reflect the deviation between prices and marginal social costs in the substitute mode.  The
optimal tax expression hence only contains the Ramsey component and the Pigouvian component,
while the congestion-related part of the modal interaction term drops out.  The Pigouvian component
is unchanged with respect to equation (6.1).  However, the dependence of the car tax on the cross-
price elasticities with respect to the substitute mode (leisure bus transport), remains.  This is reflected
in the modification, with respect to equation (6.1), of weight of the Ramsey term.  The next
paragraphs discuss the role of the cross-price effects between leisure car and bus trips.
When the cross-price elasticities are zero, the weight of the Ramsey term simplifies to (1/e11), which
is the same as in equation (6.1).  With non-zero cross price effects, the weight consists of two
components.  Assuming that the uncompensated own price elasticties are negative, that the
uncompensated cross-price elasticities are positive and that the own price effects are larger (in
absolute terms) than the cross-price effects
2, it follows that the first component is negative and the
second one positive.  As the second component is subtracted from the first one, the weight is negative
under our assumptions on the elasticities.  The overall Ramsey term is therefore positive, given that
the marginal cost of public funds is positive.
According to the first component of the weight, the Ramsey term is set such as to avoid excessive
distortions in the taxed market and in substitute markets.  The component is decreasing in the own
price elasticity of leisure car trips and in the cross-price elasticities with respect to the leisure bus
market.  It is increasing in the own price elasticity of leisure bus trips.  However, the second
component of the weight amends the first one, in the sense that it increases the Ramsey element of the
optimal tax on leisure car trips in as far as leisure bus trips are a substitute.  This increase is larger, the
better a substitute leisure bus trips are for leisure car trips.  This effect is conditional on the
assumption that leisure bus trips are taxed optimally.  If this is the case, the tax base is not reduced
strongly in case leisure car taxes primarily cause a substitution towards (optimally taxed) leisure bus
trips.
                                                     
2 These assumptions are satisfied in the applied model of section 3.10
Optimal taxes for commuting trips and for labour
Now consider the commuting transport taxes and the labour tax, while retaining the assumption of no
cross-price effects between leisure transport and commuting transport markets.  The first order
conditions only define the sum of the labour tax and the commuting tax for each mode.  The
combination of the conditions for car and bus commuting determines the car and bus commuting taxes
up to a difference with the labour tax.  This is indicated by expression (8), which is the counterpart of
(7) for the car commuting tax.  The interpretation is the same as for (7), except that now only the sum
of the car commuting tax and the labour tax is determined.  The expression for the optimal ‘bus plus
labour tax’ is fully analogous, except for the inclusion of the bus resource cost in the bus tax.
3
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Substitution of the optimal commuting tax expressions in condition (6.5) for the labour tax (taking
account of the simplification with respect to cross-price elasticities) establishes the following
relationship between the Ramsey term weights of the commuting taxes.  Let R3 denote the Ramsey
term weight of the car commuting tax (as indicated in (8)), and R4 the Ramsey term weight of the bus
commuting tax.  We then have:
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Equation (9) indicates that the Ramsey terms weights of the commuting transport taxes are inversely
related to the elasticity of labour supply.  A higher elasticity of labour supply implies less revenue
raising through commuting transport taxes.  Hence, commuting is taxed less when the tax discourages
labour supply more.  Further, note that the weighted sum of the Ramsey weights has the same sign as
the labour supply elasticity.  As the latter here refers to the tax, it can expected to be negative.  This
implies that the overall Ramsey component of commuting transport taxes is positive.  Note that this
does not necessarily lead to commuting taxes above marginal external congestion costs, as the
Pigouvian component is corrected downwards for the marginal cost of public funds.
2.2.2 Uniform transport taxes across trip purposes
In contrast to the previous section, transport taxes are now required to be uniform across trip purpose,
so that  13 24  and  car bus ttt ttt == == .  The government problem becomes:
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Since there are now three instruments for five commodities, the model describes an additional source
of second-best, in terms of transport tax instruments.  All taxes are uniquely defined.  The optimal
transport taxes now depend on the price sensitivity and the traffic flow shares of both leisure trips and11
commuting trips.  The general tax expressions for this model become rather intractable, so that we
limit the discussion to the system of equations in (11), where cross-price effects between transport
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The labour tax is seen to depend on the commuting transport taxes.  The trip interaction terms are the
same as in the case with differentiated transport taxes.  However, as will be seen next, the transport
taxes will be set differently because of the uniformity constraint.
The transport tax expressions contain a Ramsey term, which depends on the price sensitivities of the
affected trip purposes.  This is a first effect of the uniformity constraint.  Whereas in the
unconstrained case, the Ramsey term only depends on the price elasticity per mode and per purpose,
the present Ramsey term refers to both affected trip purposes.
The second effect of the uniformity constraint shows up in the co-dependence of the transport taxes
on the labour tax (cf. the second term in the transport tax expressions).  In particular, transport taxes
are revised downward in as far as a marginal labour tax change has effects on commuting (hence on
labour supply), relative to the (negative) effect of a modal price on total modal demand.  Ceteris
paribus, the higher the sensitivity of commuting to the labour tax, the larger the downward revision of
the commuting tax.  To the reverse, a higher sensitivity of transport (for all purposes) to the transport
tax, implies a lower downward revision of the transport tax.
Intuitively, this second effect indicates how, under the restriction of uniform taxes across trip
purposes, transport taxes are set to strike a balance between two policy objectives:
￿  Allowing a lower effective tax on labour supply through lower commuting taxes, and
￿  Decreasing the amount of leisure trips through higher leisure transport taxes.  The latter policy
objective is not directly related to the marginal external congestion cost, as this is tackled by the
third (Pigouvian) component of the transport tax expressions.  The actual policy goal is to reduce
leisure transport, so as to allow faster commuting travel (by either commuting mode).
Due to the uniformity constraint on the transport tax, both policy goals can only be served
imperfectly, and the optimal uniform transport tax is between the optimally differentiated taxes for
both trip purposes.12
To repeat, the basic effects of the uniformity constraint in transport taxes are that (a) the Ramsey term
refers to the price sensitivities of all affected trip purposes, and (b) the correction of the transport
taxes for the labour tax is counteracted by the desire to have a high transport tax in order to decrease
leisure trips.  As will be illustrated in the empirical illustration in section 3, the effect of the
uniformity constraint plays out differently under different assumptions on the flexibility of the labour
tax.
Before turning to the numerical implementation of the model, we briefly compare the preceding
analsysis to that of Parry and Bento (1999).  Their model contains no leisure transport, and public
transport is assumed to take place on a separate non-congested network.  Non-time resource costs of
transport are neglected.  There are only two policy instruments: the labour tax and the car commuting
tax.  Using an equal yield tax reform method, they find that the optimal car commuting tax is equal to
the marginal external congestion cost (a pure Pigouvian tax).
The intuition for this result is that in their model, the Pigouvian tax guarantees an optimal modal split,
since the relative modal prices will then reflect the marginal social costs.  However, if the public
transport tax were allowed to differ from zero, the taxes would be indeterminate as in our model of
section 2.2.1.  Note that our results indicate that setting the public transport tax equal to zero is not
necessarily optimal, even when public transport generates no congestion, as the Ramsey component
may cause the optimal tax to be non-zero.  In the Parry and Bento (1999) model, the Ramsey
component can be set to zero, as the separable structure of the utility function guarantees that the
Ramsey components are equal for car and bus commuting (so that it can fully be taken into account in
the labour tax). The absence of the public transport tax in Parry and Bento (1999) should therefore be
interpreted as a constraint on the available set of instruments.  Finally, the absence of leisure transport
modes in Parry and Bento (1999) naturally implies that trip purpose interactions do not matter.
3. Numerical illustration
3.1 Structure and calibration
The numerical model is fully analogous to the theoretical model, except that the preference structure
imposes separability restrictions and that all taxes are bounded below at zero.  The model is
programmed in GAMS (Brooke et al., 1996).  Data used in this paper are meant to reflect realistic
orders of magnitude for Belgian urbanised environments, but do not refer to any particular case.  The
representative consumer’s preferences are modelled with nested CES functions, according to the
structure depicted in figure 1.13
Figure 1 CES implementation of the utility function
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q 3 q 4
T
U + T
where:  U utility from non-work related activities
T utility from commuting and working time
q0 composite consumption commodity
q1 leisure transport by car
q2 leisure transport by bus
q3 commuting transport by car
q4 commuting transport by bus
N leisure time
NT CES index of leisure transport
NI CES index of leisure activities
The model is calibrated to a dataset representing current Belgian transport prices in urban contexts
(Van Dender and Proost, 1998) using a congestion function and quantities which are derived from a
network model for the city of Namur, Belgium (Cornélis and Van Dender, 2001).
3  The congestion
function is linear, with a free flow speed of 60 km/h.  At the reference traffic flow of 2450 passenger
car units (PCU) speed is 30 km/h.  Since a one-way trip distance of 20 km is assumed, daily travel
time for a round trip by car is ca. 1.3h.  To this we add a fixed average waiting time of 7.5 minutes
(half of a 15 minute headway) for a one-way bus trip.  The value of time, as implied by the
calibration, is 7.65 Euro/hour.  This is 47 % of the gross wage and 78 % of the net wage.  These
values are closely in line with available estimates (Small, 1992).
The total number of potential network users is 5000 individuals, of whom 1800 supply 8 hours of
labour per day.
4  The length of the working day is fixed.  The representative individual hence supplies
0.36 days, or 2.88 hours of labour per day.  The gross wage is 16.25 Euro/hour.  With a labour tax of
40 %, the net daily labour income per representative individual is 28.1 Euro.
                                                     
3 Calibrating this model requires the simultaneous solution of the system of first order conditions for the
consumer.  This is in contrast to models with fixed marginal values of time, where a (separable and
parameterised) bottom-up calibration procedure is applicable.  The simpler parameterised calibration procedure
is not suitable here, as the multipliers of the money and time budget constraints for the consumer are not
observed.  These multipliers determine, a.o., the marginal value of time.
4 The population size as such is of little importance.  It is scaled in order to accord with available road
capacity.  The labour force participation rate is taken to be 36%.14
The modal split for commuting transport is two thirds car trips and one third bus trips.  For leisure
trips the car is used for 75 % of all trips.  Commuting trips stand for 53 % of the total number of trips.
These proportions are roughly consistent with the Belgian Mobility Survey (Pollet, 2000) and with
more detailed data for Brussels (IRIS, 1993), if it is assumed that the bus mode is easily accessible in
our example.  The reference traffic flow of 2450  PCU is obtained by assuming that the average
occupancy rate and PCU equivalent of a car is 1, while the average occupancy rate of a bus is 40 and
the PCU equivalent of a bus is 2.  The reference taxes for bus trips are sufficient to cover marginal
external congestion costs
5, while this is not the case for car trips.  The ratio of taxes over marginal
external congestion costs is 0.62 for car trips and 1.53 for bus trips.
In a CES function, the combination of elasticities of substitution with prices and quantities determines
price elasticities.  The values of the elasticities of substitution used for the central case, and the
resulting compensated price elasticties for the reference equilibrium, are in table 1.  The sensitivity of
the results to these parameters is discussed in section 3.3.
The compensated elasticity of labour supply is 0.19.  This is in line with the central estimates (0.15)
in Hansson and Stuart (1985) and Ballard et al. (1985). It is below the values of 0.35 and 1.09, used
by Parry and Bento (1999) and Mayeres (1999) respectively.  The elasticity of labour supply is a key
parameter in the model.  It is mainly determined by the elasticity of substitution between q0 and NI.
We refer to section 3.3 for some insight into the dependence of model results on this parameter.
The own price elasticity of demand for commuting trips is determined by the labour supply elasticity.
It is lower for commuting trips than for leisure trips.  In addition, we choose parameters in the central
scenario such that the cross-price elasticities between transport modes is larger for commuting trips
than for leisure trips.  The underlying assumption is that the availability of public transport modes is
larger for commuting trips than for leisure trips, because of differences in the spatial distribution of
origins and destinations.  The model results are not very sensitive to these parameters however
(section 3.3).
                                                     
5 At least within the assumption that the marginal external congestion cost for each passenger’s bus trip is
found by equally distributing the marginal external cost of the vehicle over all occupants.15
Table 1 Elasticities of substitution and main compensated price elasticities, central scenario
Elasticities of substitution
   Composite commodity – leisure index q0 – NI 0.7
   Leisure transport – other leisure NT – N 1.1
   Leisure car trips – leisure bus trips q1 – q2 0.9









3.2 Transport tax reform at the reference labour tax rate
The effects of optimising transport taxes for the given labour tax rate of 40% are summarised in table
2, where the optimal differentiated and optimal uniform transport taxes are compared to the reference
equilibrium.









Welfare index 1 1.001299 1.000189
Transport tax (Euro/trip)
(1) leisure car trips 4.240 7.407 4.840
(2) leisure bus trips 0.527 1.034 0
(3) commuting car trips 4.240 0 4.840
(4) commuting bus trips 0.527 0 0
Trip demand
Total trip demand (index) 1 0.965 1.000
Share of commuting trips 53.0% 56.3% 52.8%
Modal split
Share of car trips: leisure 75.0% 73.5% 74.0%
Share of car trips: commuting 67.0% 80.1% 58.8%
Share of car trips: all trips 70.6% 77.2% 66.0%
Taxes/marginal external congestion costs
(1) leisure car trips 0.617 1.078 0.700
(2) leisure bus trips 1.533 2.983 0
(3) commuting car trips 0.617 0 0.700
(4) commuting bus trips 1.533 0 0
In the reference equilibrium, transport taxes are uniform across trip purposes.  Car taxes are below
marginal external congestion costs, while bus taxes exceed them.  This situation is not optimal in the
sense that a better use of uniform or differentiated transport taxes produces a welfare gain of 0.019%
and 0.13% respectively.  Clearly, welfare gains are limited in both cases, and close to negligible for
optimal uniform transport taxes.
6
                                                     
6 The size of the welfare gains is mainly determined by the expenditure share of transport, the reference
composition of the traffic flow, the congestion function and the labour supply elasticity.  The influence of the16
When differentiation of transport taxes is possible and the labour tax rate remains at the reference
level, commuting transport is not taxed.  Both types of leisure trips are taxed above marginal external
congestion cost, however.  Hence there is a clear shift to the taxation of relative complements to
leisure.  The main quantity effect of optimal differentiated transport taxes is the slight increase of
commuting trips (and labour supply) and the decrease of leisure trip demand.  This leads to a higher
share of commuting trips in total trip demand.  Total trip demand falls, but the marginal external
congestion cost slightly increases because of the increased marginal value of time.  The absence of a
car commuting tax leads to an increase of the modal share of cars in commuting.
7
The explanation of the welfare gain from optimal uniform transport taxes is different.  Here the main
effect is that the modal split in commuting is changed in favour of buses.  Labour supply and
commuting remain virtually unchanged with respect to the reference situation.  Leisure trip demand
increases slightly, and the modal split in leisure transport is only slightly affected.  Hence the only
effect of this policy is to reduce congestion by setting the bus tax at zero and by slightly increasing the
reference car tax, so as to modify the overall modal split in favour of buses.  The car tax remains
below marginal external congestion costs, however, in order to avoid further increases in the effective
tax on labour supply.  The main problem of uniform transport taxes at the reference labour tax rate is
that they can not generate a shift of the tax burden to relative complements of leisure.  The welfare
gain is accordingly low.
The next sections release the constraint on labour taxes.  As will be seen, this leads to larger welfare
improvements, both in the case of differentiated and uniform transport taxes.  The essential insight is
that the reference labour tax rate is too high to permit the realisation of the full potential of optimal
(non-negative) transport taxes.
3.3 Optimal differentiated transport taxes with flexible labour tax rates
This section presents results from optimal differentiated transport taxes, as analysed in section 2.2.1.
In contrast to the theoretical analysis, the numerical model requires taxes to be non-negative.  The
optimal differentiated tax structure can succinctly be written as in (12), where all taxes are the sum of
























The following properties of the tax structure are worth repeating:
￿  The tax expressions take no account of interactions with distortions on other transport markets.
This is possible as long as all instruments are available.  The Ramsey terms take account of
demand interactions between markets, as in equations (7) and (8).
                                                                                                                                                                     
latter is highlighted in section 3.5.  Here we are mainly concerned with the relative performance of different
policy types.
7 Recall that there is no waiting time for car trips, so the observed modal switch leads to time savings.17
￿  Because of the complementarity constraint between labour supply and commuting trips, no
separate expression is required for the labour tax.  However, only the sum of labour and
commuting transport taxes is defined.  Also, R3 and R4 refer to the tax base formed by commuting
and by labour supply.
￿  The marginal external congestion costs from a bus trip are proportional to those of a car trip.  The
factor of proportionality is given by a.  The marginal external congestion cost of a car trip or a
bus trip is not affected by the trip purpose.
￿  All taxes are bounded below at zero.  For bus trips this means that no net subsidy is possible, as
the tax is equal to the fare.  For car trips the restriction implies that drivers will always incur the
resource costs of the car trip.
From (12) it is clear that tax differentiation across trip purposes for a given transport mode only
relates to the Ramsey component of the tax.  It is well known that the Ramsey components crucially
depend on the relative complementarity of the tax good with respect to (untaxed) leisure, in the sense
that tax rates on relative complements to leisure are relatively high.
8  The structure of the numerical
model, see figure 1, of course implies that leisure trips are more complementary to leisure than
commuting trips.  Relatively high tax rates on leisure trips are therefore to be expected.  However, the
optimal commuting transport tax depends on the prevailing labour tax rate.  When the labour tax rate
is low, commuting transport taxes will act as pure labour taxes, so that they become relatively high.
In other words, the tax base is different for leisure trips and for commuting trips, and the way in
which this difference plays out depends on the labour tax rate.
The theoretical analysis did not rule out negative optimal transport taxes. In case an optimal tax
should be negative, the lower bound of zero becomes binding in the numerical model, and we have a
constrained optimal tax system.  From (12) and from the discussion of the Ramsey terms, it can be
inferred that the lower bound can only be reached when the labour tax rate is set too high.  More
precisely, as will be illustrated below, the lower bound will first be reached for the tax on bus
commuting.  Indeed, marginal external congestion costs for buses are low compared to those of cars,
and bus commuting is a relative substitute for leisure.  The numerical model hence implies a threshold
value for the labour tax, above which the model becomes a constrained model:  4 L car p tR Pc a ³+ + .
This has several implications:
￿  The effectiveness of the tax system is reduced, so that lower welfare gains are obtained.
￿  Once the first transport tax becomes zero, the first-order conditions (4.6) can no longer be applied
unconditionally.
￿  The indeterminacy of the optimal taxes on labour and commuting trips no longer holds.
Given this a priori information, the main contribution of the numerical model lies in the identification
of the threshold value for the labour tax, which here equals 32.5%.  As this is below the reference
labour tax rate of 40%, we can conclude that the full welfare potential from differentiated transport
taxes can only be reached when the reference labour tax is substantially reduced.  Table 3 compares
the effects of transport tax differentiation without and with labour tax optimisation.  The optimal
labour tax rate is set at the upper bound of 32.5%.  Because of the indeterminacy of the tax system,
                                                     
8 This insight is not dependent on the particular normalisation of the model, cf. e.g. Munk, 1999.18
the same gain can be achieved below the threshold labour tax, through a simple correction of
commuting transport taxes for the decreasing labour tax.  The optimal leisure transport taxes are
constant for labour tax rates between 0% and 32.5%.












Welfare index 1 1.001299 1.004208
Transport tax (Euro/trip)
(1) leisure car trips 4.240 7.407 16.285
(2) leisure bus trips 0.527 1.034 8.823
(3) commuting car trips 4.240 0 5.457
(4) commuting bus trips 0.527 0 0
Trip demand
Total trip demand (index) 1 0.965 0.900
Share of commuting trips 53.0% 56.3% 62.9%
Modal split
Share of car trips: leisure 75.0% 73.5% 74.5%
Share of car trips: commuting 67.0% 80.1% 63.3%
Share of car trips: all trips 70.6% 77.2% 67.5%
Taxes/marginal external congestion
costs
(1) leisure car trips 0.617 1.078 2.302
(2) leisure bus trips 1.533 2.983 24.950
(3) commuting car trips 0.617 0 0.772
(4) commuting bus trips 1.533 0 0
With an optimal labour tax rate, transport tax differentiation achieves an increase in commuting trips
and labour supply of 6%.  The welfare gain is now 0.4% with respect to the reference situation, which
is more than three times higher than in the case with the reference labour tax rate.  The modal split is
modified in favour of buses, but much more so for commuting than for leisure trips.  More
importantly, the decrease in leisure trip demand is large enough to generate a strong net decrease in
transport demand.  However, like in section 3.2, the improved tax system involves an increase in the
marginal value of time savings, so that the marginal external congestion costs actually increase.
With respect to the transport taxes, note that all leisure transport is taxed well above marginal external
congestion costs, the reverse holding for commuting transport.  This is the consequence of the
difference in the Ramsey terms across trip purposes.  Note that the tax on commuting trips will
increase as the labour tax decreases, without any further effects on the properties of the optimum.
Finally, the difference between car and bus taxes is larger for leisure trips than for commuting trips.
This is a consequence of the larger elasticity of substitution, implying larger own and cross-price
elasticities, between cars and buses for commuting trips.19
3.4 The welfare loss from the uniformity constraint with flexible labour tax rates
In section 3.2 the effectiveness of uniform transport taxes was seen to be much smaller than that of
differentiated transport taxes, when the labour tax rate was fixed at the reference level.  As is clear
from section 3.3 the reference labour tax exceeds the threshold level, below which the full gains from
differentiating transport taxes can be realised.  It is therefore interesting to find out how the
effectiveness of differentiated and uniform taxes compares at different levels of the labour tax rate.
Figure 2 compares the welfare gains from both experiments for a range of labour tax rates between
0% and 45%.
In general the uniformity constraint is seen to be costly in terms of welfare. Uniform transport taxes
generate less welfare improvement than differentiated transport taxes, for two reasons.  First, the
uniform tax is a weighted average of the differentiated taxes (cf. equation (11)), and is therefore less
effective in correcting the modal split for both trip purposes.  This effect is relatively small, as the
difference between the substitutability between modes across trip purposes is rather small.  Second,
under optimal differentiation of transport taxes, the commuting taxes depend strongly on the
prevailing labour tax rate.  Therefore, when the labour tax rate calls for strong differentiation of
transport taxes (because of the relative complementarities to leisure), the welfare cost of uniform
transport taxes is relatively large.  Indeed, the model results show that the deviation between the
optimal uniform tax on cars and the optimal differentiated car taxes is very small at a labour tax rate
of 24%.  The analogous deviation for bus taxes is smallest between 25% and 26%.  The best uniform
transport tax system should therefore be found at labour tax rates between 24% and 26%.
Furthermore, as the car mode is dominant, the best uniform system should be found closer to the
labour tax rate of 24%, as is the case.
Figure 2 also illustrates that exceeding the threshold labour tax rate of 32.5% leads to welfare losses
from optimal differentiated taxes.  The performance of uniform taxes is affected as well, both because
of the uniformity constraint as such and because of the level of the labour tax.  The higher the labour
tax rate becomes, the smaller the divergence between both types of transport tax reform.  At very high
levels of labour taxes, the transport taxes loose most of their potential.  The explanation is that, as the
labour tax increases, all transport taxes gradually fall to zero.20
Figure 2 Welfare effects of optimal transport taxes for given labour tax rates
3.5 Sensitivity analysis
Elasticity of substitution between leisure and other commodities
As the preceding analysis suggests that the welfare effects of transport tax reform depend to a
substantial degree on the interaction with labour taxes and labour supply, it is no surprise that the
model results are mainly dependent on the elasticity of substitution between leisure and other goods.
We summarise the basic impact of increasing and decreasing the elasticity of substitution (the
compensated labour supply elasticity) from 0.7 (0.19) to 1.2 (0.28) and 0.3 (0.11) respectively.
The welfare potential of optimal tax reforms for constant tax revenue requirements increases with the
labour supply elasticity, from 0.06% for the lowest and 1.13% for the highest elasticity.  Traffic levels
reduce less strongly as the labour supply elasticity rises, mainly because of a relatively higher number
of commuting trips by car.  Hence, the optimal congestion levels are an increasing function of the
labour supply elasticity.  Also, it is noteworthy that the level of leisure trips falls less drastically as the
labour supply elasticity rises.  This means that there is less need to ‘tax leisure trips off the road’ for
higher elasticities of labour supply.
When computing optimal differentiation of transport taxes for constant labour taxes, it is the case for
most values of the elasticity that the optimal car commuting tax is zero.  However, when the labour
supply elasticity is sufficiently small, the model suggests a qualitative change in the nature of the
second-best policy.  Instead of focussing on tax differentials between trip purposes in order to
increase labour supply, it becomes preferable to set taxes such that the modal split for commuting
trips is strongly changed, in favour of bus trips.  This requires a positive car commuting tax.  In other
words, as the labour supply elasticity diminishes, the policy objective of reducing congestion for
current labour supply levels becomes more important than the objective of increasing labour supply
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differentiated transport taxes uniform transport taxes21
tax structure that promotes a modal shift towards buses.  This is the same type of policy that was
observed in section 3.2 for optimal uniform transport taxes at the reference labour tax rate.
Cross price elasticities between transport modes
Decreases in the elasticities of substitution between transport modes, in commuting and/or in leisure
transport, have no major impacts on the welfare effects of the various policy experiments, nor on the
values of the taxes.  The most important changes are that (a) as the degree of substitutability between
commuting by car and by bus decreases, leisure transport is decreased relatively more, so as to allow
increases in both types of commuting, but at a higher aggregate congestion level; (b) as the degree of
substitutability between leisure transport modes decreases, labour supply increases somewhat less
compared to the central scenario while the optimal (equal yield) congestion level is slightly higher.
4. Conclusion
On the basis of the numerical implementation of a simple general equilibrium model for multi-modal
and multi-purpose passenger transport, we find that the welfare effects of transport tax reform depend
to a large extent on the impact on labour supply.  In order to have a substantial impact on labour
supply, transport tax reform should be accompanied by labour tax changes.  When this is not possible
through a direct change of the labour tax, the reform should treat commuting transport and leisure
transport differently.  In general, the results suggest that the relative welfare cost of uniformly taxing
different trip purposes is substantial.
Optimal transport tax reforms lead to a combined increase of labour supply and a decrease in the total
trip volume and the associated costs of congestion, with respect to the reference situation.  In order to
obtain the maximal welfare gain from transport tax differentiation, the labour tax should be low
enough to sustain non-negative transport taxes.  The volume of commuting trips increases, but this is
more than compensated by a decrease in peak period leisure trips.  It can be expected that in a
multiperiod model, leisure trips will be seen to shift to offpeak hours, so that the total demand
decrease becomes smaller.
Note that exogenous parameter values have large effects on the results, in quantitative and in
qualitative terms.  The results described here should be considered as exploratory.  The sensitivity
analysis suggests that the results of carefully implemented case studies will not be transferable across
cases, both because of the impact of the reference composition of traffic flows and because of the
elasticity values.  For instance, in our illustration, the reference share of leisure trips is substantial,
and it is assumed that a substantial shift of commuting trips towards buses is possible at constant
marginal cost.  These assumptions may not be valid for all urban areas.  The gains from transport tax
reforms will decrease when peak period traffic consists mainly of commuting trips, and when
expansion of public transport supply is not possible at a constant marginal cost.
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